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Abstract 
In the varieties of capitalism literature, Germany is understood as a monolithic model of a 
coordinated market economy. This analysis shows how institutions for configuring capital 
and labour at the national level are implemented at state and regional level. By focussing on 
the labour side this article gives a contribution to the investor dominated shareholder value 
discussion. It identifies a spatial distinction between capital and labour and concludes a vari-
ation of German Models instead of one German Model. 
Keywords: 
Corporate Governance, Labour–Management Relations, Political Economy, Size and Spatial 
Distributions of Regional Economic Activity 
JEL classification: G34, J53, P16, R12 
 
Titel 
Deutsches Modell oder deutsche Modelle?  
Räumliche Unterschiede in der Börsennotierung und Arbeitnehmerrepräsentation in 
Deutschland 
Zusammenfassung 
In der Varieties-of-Capitalism-Literatur ist Deutschland ein klassisches Beispiel für eine 
koordinierte Marktwirtschaft. Die vorliegende Analyse zeigt, wie die nationalen institutio-
nellen Größen Kapital und Arbeit auf Ebene der Bundesländer variieren. Dazu wird einerseits 
die räumliche Verteilung der börsennotierten Unternehmen für vier deutsche Leitindizes 
illustriert. Korrespondierend wird andererseits die Repräsentation der Arbeitnehmer in 
diesen Unternehmen mittels eines Index' veranschaulicht. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich eine Zwei-
teilung: entweder gibt es besonders viele Firmen mit einer eher geringen durchschnittlichen 
Arbeitnehmerrepräsentation oder eher wenige Firmen und dafür eine vergleichsweise hohe 
Verankerung der Arbeitnehmervertretung. Auf subnationaler Ebene gibt es daher eine 
starke Variation innerhalb des idealisierten homogenen deutschen Modells. 
Schlüsselwörter:  
Unternehmensführung, Arbeitgeber-Arbeitnehmer-Beziehungen, Politische Ökonomie, 
Räumliche Verteilung regionalökonomischer Aktivitäten  
JEL Klassifikation: G34, J53, P16, R12 
  
 5 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
1. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................................... 6 
2. The manifold effects of large companies from a theoretical point of view .............................. 6 
3. The responsibilities of large and stock listed companies .............................................................. 8 
 3.1. Corporate Governance ............................................................................................................................ 8 
 3.2. Corporatist Germany with spatially anchored codetermination ........................................ 9 
 3.3. Interplay of capital and labour within the German Model ................................................. 11 
 3.4. Research Question ................................................................................................................................. 12 
4. Empirical Specification ................................................................................................................................ 13 
 4.1. Measuring the investors’ favourites ............................................................................................. 13 
 4.2. Measuring the workers’ voice .......................................................................................................... 14 
 4.3. Data ............................................................................................................................................................... 15 
5. Results ................................................................................................................................................................. 16 
 5.1. Mapping the investors’ favourites ................................................................................................. 16 
 5.2. Mapping the workers’ voice .............................................................................................................. 18 
 5.3. Spatial configuration of capital and labour ............................................................................... 21 
6. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................................................... 22 
7. References.......................................................................................................................................................... 24 
 
 6 
 
1. Introduction1 
The 30 largest stock listed companies in Germany have 3.95 million employees in total with 1.58 
at home and 2.37 abroad. These few companies have an essential impact on the economy, society 
and ecology and with that a certain responsibility in shaping life on earth. Picking up the debate 
about corporate governance in economic geography this paper adds a further puzzle to the dis-
cussion. It illustrates the spatial link between companies’ relevance on the stock exchange and 
their level of labour representation in the corporate governance. Especially for Germany the legal 
constitution is specific due to representatives of employees in supervisory boards of companies 
with more than 500 (one third) and 2,000 employees (parity). Given this fact, it is worth investi-
gating the question, of how – from a spatial perspective – stock exchange listings and codetermi-
nation are intertwined in Germany. 
The article is structured as follows. Section two presents different conceptually derived effects of 
large companies to underline the importance of the research question. Section three adds argu-
ments on why these companies have a crucial responsibility in diverse spheres and how corpo-
rate governance is influenced by institutional arrangements, especially for the German case 
where labour representatives are included in the supervisory boards. Section four introduces the 
empirical methodology and data. Section five illustrates the regional distribution of companies 
based on their stock exchange listing (investors’ favourites) and codetermination options 
(workers’ voice) and discusses the spatial interplay of both spheres. Section six concludes. 
2. The manifold effects of large companies from a theoretical point of view 
Companies are not just producers. They are embedded in spatially anchored systems of value cre-
ation and have varied effects on economy, society and ecology, which tend to increase with com-
panies’ size. Many studies have identified and specified the impact of firms in different spheres. 
From a regional perspective firms are crucial for employment, income, tax and stability (Maier & 
Tödtling 2006, p. 74), innovation, research and development (Malecki 1980, pp. 219ff.) and voca-
tional training or employees’ competence development (Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice 2001, p. 
170; Pilz & Li 2014, pp. 745ff.; Scholz 2016, pp. 104ff.). Furthermore they are part of value chains 
and affect suppliers, customers, competitors and other actors – both home and abroad (Sabel & 
Piore 1984, Schamp 1996). In configuring their frequently internationalized production networks, 
large companies play an important role and define diverse standards (Braun 2005, pp. 3ff.), and 
manage the globalisation of production-related knowledge as well as scientific-technical and 
R&D-related knowledge (Fuchs 2014, p. 64). From an organisational point of view, large companies 
have specific ways of organizing their business, for instance, by function (production, finance, 
marketing etc.) or by division (product A, product B etc.) (Chapman & Walker 1987, p. 101). Among 
other things, these structures are reasons for a frequent activity of large companies in mergers 
and acquisitions (UNCTAD 2016, p. 208, Zademach 2005, p. 12). Furthermore large companies have 
                                                     
1.  I would like to thank the Hans-Böckler-Foundation for financial support for the project 
"Codetermination and a future-oriented corporate governance – Measurement of strength and 
influence through an Index of Codetermination (MB-ix)".
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a societal and political relevance. Companies pay taxes and therefore influence the public budget 
on the national, state, county or municipality level (Blum, Jänchen & Lubk 2015, p. 397). To under-
line the dimension more abstractly, it can be found that the sales of the largest firms are higher 
than the gross income of whole countries. Therefore business leaders are well connected with 
elites in collective organisations, politics, administrations, science and other actors. 
These diverse impacts of large companies have led to an inversion of thinking in the economic 
geography debate. Classical approaches analyse spatial characteristics and argue, sometimes in a 
strictly deterministic way, they are cause for companies’ development. Based on the relational 
turn, these conceptualizations focus more on actors, their strategies and institutions (Bathelt & 
Glückler 2011; Storper &Walker 1989). They reverse the previous argument and assume that com-
panies develop the spatial configuration in different dimensions. For example companies attract 
labour, infrastructure investments and R&D-agencies and therefore influence their spatial con-
centration or dispersion.  
By including the diverse impacts of companies on spatial developments the research concludes a 
further qualitative difference depending on the structure of the companies. In particular the 
headquarters are disproportionate important because they make decisions for the whole com-
pany. Headquarters are characterized by a concentration of management functions, like coordi-
nation and supervision, and knowledge-based functions, like research and development or 
administration (Blum, Jänchen & Lubk 2015, p. 396; Maier & Tödtling 2006, pp. 71ff.). Because they 
attract these functions the headquarters pool staff with qualification and income above average – 
in addition to the fact that large employers pay generally higher wages than smaller ones (Bayard 
& Troske 1999; Brown & Medoff 1989; Hu 2003; Schmidt & Zimmermann 1991). 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of German companies by size groups 2014 
 Number of 
companies 
(share of 
sum in %) 
Number of 
employees 
(share of 
sum in %) 
Turnover 
in mill. 
Euro 
(share of 
sum in %) 
Turnover 
per 
employee in 
Euro 
Gross investments 
in property, plant 
and equipment in 
mill. Euro (share 
of sum in %) 
Companies with 
gross investments 
(share of absolute 
number of 
companies in %) 
Smallest companies:  
0 to 9 employees and up to 2 
mill. Euro turnover 
2,052,170 
(82.1) 
5,419,218 
(19.5) 
402,890 
(6.7) 
74,345 26,133 
(13.2) 
 
794,703 
(38.7) 
Small companies:  
Up to 49 employees and up to 
10 mill. Euro turnover and 
no smallest company 
362,028 
(14.5) 
6,216,163 
(22.4) 
679,026 
(11.3) 
109,236 28,059 
(14.1) 
 
261,420 
(72.2) 
Medium-sized companies:  
Up to 249 employees and up 
to 50 mill. Euro turnover and 
no small company 
66,786 
(2.7) 
5,277,795 
(19.0) 
872,762 
(14.6) 
 
165,365 33,005 
(16.6) 
 
55,176 
(82.6) 
 
Large companies:  
More than 249 employees or 
more than 50 mill. Euro 
turnover  
16,688 
(0.7) 
10,867,921 
(39.1) 
4,028,726 
(67.4) 
370,699 111,532 
(56.1) 
 
14,783 
(88.6) 
 
All 2,497,672 
(100.0) 
27,781,097 
(100.0) 
5,983,404 
(100.0) 
215,377 198,729 
(100.0) 
1,126,081 
(45.1) 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2016b. 
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These diverse theoretical arguments, which are only summarized here, indicate a high relevance 
of the large companies. To underline the economic effects Table 1 shows some characteristics of 
German companies grouped by their size. The majority of companies by number are smallest 
companies (82.1%); and the small and medium-sized (SME) companies employ 60.9% of workers 
(Söllner 2014, pp. 40ff.). The well-known German Mittelstand is important to note. However, the 
large companies have a crucial role too. They represent just 0.7% of the companies, but 39.1% of 
the employees, 67.4% of all turnovers, accompanied by the highest turnover rate per employee. 
56.1% of gross investments are done by large companies and nearly 9 of 10 make gross invest-
ments, which are important for ensuring the companies’ future and thereby jobs and long-term 
regional and national incomes. These basic structural facts underline the importance of the large 
companies in Germany, from a general economic point of view. 
3. The responsibilities of large and stock listed companies 
3.1.  Corporate Governance 
The above mentioned manifold impacts of companies underline the fact that firms are not just 
economic entities. They assume certain responsibilities that are inherent elements of corporate 
governance concepts. Corporate governance can be basically understood as “the study of power 
and influence over decision making within the corporation” (Aguilera & Jackson 2010, p. 487). The 
concept focuses on practices, structures and institutional arrangements that allocate power 
among different stakeholders and the companies (Benton 2017, pp. 661ff.; Blair 1995, p. 3). A more 
narrow interpretation of corporate governance highlights the investors’ perspective by focusing 
on the interplay between shareholders, directors and managers (Davis 2005, p. 143). Corporate 
governance, for example, concretely affects the members of the management, their remunera-
tion, the allocation of returns and the companies’ mergers and acquisitions activities (Benton 
2017, p. 662). 
Although shareholders are just one group of stakeholders, the shareholder value model declares 
them the central group. From this classical Anglo-American point of view, the shareholders are 
the original founders and claimants of companies. They “have used their capital to hire employees 
and managers and to buy equipment and raw materials […and] after the claims of other factors of 
production are satisfied shareholders get the rest […] with empty pockets if the firm goes bank-
rupt […or] unlimited profits when the firm does well” (Vitols 2011, p. 16). All information is taking 
into share prices and they reflect the long-term prospects of the firm and the company value. 
That corporations should “create shareholder value became managerial orthodoxy, taken for 
granted by investors, executives, and policymakers alike” (Davis 2005, p. 149). Additionally, the 
most senior and top-level managers of corporations are evaluated and compensated on the basis 
of stock market and share price performance (Benton 2017, p. 662). 
Despite the overwhelming success of the shareholder value model it should be noted that there is 
a high variation of corporate governance regarding different dimensions. Corporate governance 
differs at spatial scales and therefore with the broader socioeconomic system in which it is 
embedded (Wójcik 2006, p. 643). The relevance of laws, regulations or sanctions varies a lot and 
some institutions are regulated and required by laws, while many others are voluntary or only 
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implemented by adopting best practices (Aguilera & Jackson 2010, p. 487; Anand, Milne & Purda 
2012, p. 76; Bauer, Braun & Clark 2008, p. 444). However, a crucial number of rules of corporate 
governance are made by the (global) investors or stock exchanges (Dixon 2010, p. 202; Gray 2011, 
pp. 2202ff.; Zademach 2009, pp. 697ff.). They define increasingly global standards, directly or indi-
rectly by calling for transparency. Although transparency refers primarily to indicators of eco-
nomic performance, an increasing number of investors and interested stakeholders are demand-
ing further information about social or ecologic operations, like in sustainability reports. 
Benton (2017, p. 662) links the prominence of the shareholder value model also in relation to the 
development of the agency theory in the academic discussion. This approach deals concretely 
with asymmetric information and hierarchical arrangements between principals (shareholders) 
and agents (managers) and therefore precisely reflects the shareholder value configuration. But, 
the ongoing scientific and political debate, especially in the context of the financial crisis 
2008/09, called into question the imperative shareholder value. Some investors changed their 
investment focus and forced more transparency. Normative concepts were also altered or 
reframed by including ideas of sustainability. This means, for instance, that the company involves 
stakeholders in decision making, has a set of sustainability goals and a detailed strategy for 
achieving these goals. Or the company has an externally verifiable reporting system on both 
financial and nonfinancial (environmental, social, etc.) performance, ties a portion of executive 
remuneration to the achievement of sustainability goals, and is dominated by long-term respon-
sible investors concerned not only with financial return but also with the social and environ-
mental impacts of their investments (Vitols 2011, pp. 24ff.). Therefore, alternative concepts 
already exist and alter the traditional shareholder value model (Aguilera & Jackson 2010, p. 488). 
And taking into account the described varied influence of large companies from the second sec-
tion, the overriding focus on the shareholders appears incomprehensible. In addition to this 
argument, the following section deals with the German case of corporate governance and specify 
further configurations that weaken the shareholder value dominance. 
3.2.  Corporatist Germany with spatially anchored codetermination 
The previous section described the idea and guiding principle of maximizing shareholder value 
based on a perfect model of Anglo-American origin which primarily distinguishes between inter-
ests of shareholders and managers (Bauer, Braun & Clark 2008, p. 444; Wójcik 2006, pp. 641f.). But 
the common practiced formation of governing corporations is not isolated and varies at different 
spatial scales, especially at the national level (Aguilera & Jackson 2010, pp. 492ff.). At this national 
level extensive political decisions are made, for instance in labour market regulation, and 
national institutions have a high weighting and influence (Whitley 2005, p. 191). But there are 
differences in legal contexts, the political system, the education system, finance and industrial 
relations, which affect the configuration of corporate governance systems (Benton 2017, p. 665). 
From a comparative point of view the varieties of capitalism approach makes a distinction 
between liberal market economies, e.g. U.K., and coordinated market economies, e.g. Germany 
(Hall & Soskice 2001, p. 8). One of the many characteristics of coordinated market economies is 
the importance of cooperative industrial relations by organized companies in employer associations 
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and employees in unions. Accompanied by general welfare state formation the corporate governance 
system in Germany evolved (Hassel 1999, pp. 484ff.). It can be described in different ways but the 
following part deals in particular with how labour is formally represented in companies. In prin-
ciple, there are two legal ways to represent the labour force vis-à-vis the employers. 
The first way regulates the codetermination at establishment level via works councils, based on 
the Works Constitution Act of 1952 (betriebliche Mitbestimmung). A works council can be elected in 
companies with at least five employees and is committed to working together with the employers 
in a trusting and interactive way for the benefit of the employees and the company. The works 
council has graduated rights of codetermination, decreasing from social via personnel to eco-
nomic matters (Müller-Jentsch 2011, p. 90ff.). Specific for this German type of labour representa-
tion at establishment level is the fact that in some cases the employer cannot act without the 
permission of the works council, for example, in questions of working time regulation. Yet, the 
implementation of a works council is voluntary and not every company has one, although it could 
have one. The larger the company, the more likely it is that a works council exists (Kißler, Grei-
fenstein & Schneider 2011, p. 109ff.). 
The second way of labour representation focuses on the companies’ supervisory board, codeter-
mination at board level (Unternehmensmitbestimmung) (Streeck 2004, p. 880). This type is based on 
three laws: The Coal and Steel Industry Codetermination Law of 1951 (Montanmitbestimmungs-
gesetz), the Industrial Constitution Law of 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) and the Codetermina-
tion Law of 1976 (Mitbestimmungsgesetz). Corporations have a dualistic structure with the board of 
management (Vorstand), responsible for the leadership of the company, and the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat), responsible for the control of the management board. The supervisory board is 
elected by the shareholders annual general meeting and by employees and unions if the company 
is codetermined. There are three main possibilities regarding the composition of the supervisory 
board: a) representatives of investors only, b) two thirds representatives of investors and one 
third of labour force (employees) and c) one half by representatives of investors and one half by 
representatives of labour force (employees and unions). In principle the type of codetermination 
at the board level is determined by the number of employees, which means no representation at 
the supervisory board if there is less than 500 employees, one-third employee representation if 
there is more than 500 and parity in the supervisory board if more than 2,000 employees (Hans-
Böckler-Stiftung 2001, pp. 46ff.). The supervisory board is responsible for the appointment, dis-
missal and remuneration of the management board directly and monitors the strategic orienta-
tion of the company. Hence this body of representatives influences the companies’ activities in 
different ways; that is, it influences the development of new technologies, implementation of 
organisational changes or mergers and acquisitions. This overarching function leads, in the case 
of codetermined supervisory boards, to a complementary strengthening of the workers’ voice in 
addition to the codetermination at establishment level (Köstler, Müller & Sick 2013, p. 77). 
Whereas works councils represent the employees’ special interests at plant level, the labour rep-
resentatives in the supervisory boards can influence the overall and strategic corporate policy to 
promote innovations, secure jobs, foster sustainability and with that regional prosperity. 
Based on that, codetermination in the boards as a national institution is linked to the regional 
implementation at the companies’ headquarters. With the locational anchored variation of labour 
representation in the boards the implementation of the German Model differs spatially. The 
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national level of the varieties of capitalism approach has a monolithic understanding and a strong 
focus on the institutional complementarities of the two poles of liberal and coordinated market 
economies (Bathelt & Gertler 2005, p. 2). The research has already established concepts without a 
strong national focus, like the sociological oriented business system approach (Karnøe 1999, 
Whitley 1992, 2005) or geographical oriented cluster concepts (Karlsson 2008, Voelzkow 2007). 
These concepts are more detailed but the business system approach focuses primarily on compa-
nies’ organisational structures whereas cluster concepts usually concentrate on special sectors in 
single regions. Both concepts operate on a subnational level but offer a very little overall descrip-
tion of the coordination of capital and labour, which does the varieties of capitalism. Therefore 
this paper suggests combining both discussion lines to refine the monolithic varieties of capital-
ism approach and differentiates from a qualitative and spatial perspective. 
3.3.  Interplay of capital and labour within the German Model 
Complementing existing works about corporate governance in the light of the shareholder value 
model, this paper wants to add a further piece of the puzzle – a stronger labour perspective. The 
crucial factors, capital and labour, are intertwined and immediately necessary for the companies, 
and for the regional economies too. Figure 1 shows this interplay.  
Figure 1: Attractiveness of companies for capital and labour 
companies‘
creation of value
(by using specific 
technologies and 
procedures)
institutional setting and economic effects for the income
at different spatial scales (for instance global, national, regional, local)
attractivity through
relevance at stock market
attractivity through
relevance of workers‘ voice
capital
market
long-term
(as pension funds)
mid-term
(as mutual funds)
short-term
(as hedge funds)
labour
market
long-term
(as core 
workforce)
mid-term
(as job guarantees)
short-term
(as temporary work)
demand, 
negotiations 
and contracting
 
Source: Own illustration. 
 
The companies need capital from investors with different maturity dates as well as labour at dif-
ferent times and both sides are linked generally. For example, the development of new trains, e-
cars, and power stations or the diffusion of fundamentally new distribution channels in the 
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retailing sector requires long-term investors and a certain core staff. Merely establishing a new 
series of cars or implementing a new commercial product line is not that expensive and make 
both the investments and employment temporally predictable, which is secured by job and loca-
tion guarantees. Finally, there are short-term financing deals for special projects as well as the 
usage of short-term employment to take for example seasonal variations into account. The com-
panies try to fulfil their needs at the capital and labour market permanently in consideration to 
these different quantitative, qualitative and temporal requirements, which depend on the specific 
creation of value. They demand, negotiate and make contracts. 
At the same time, investors and labour are interested in companies. From the investor’s point of 
view, corporations are attractive if the invested money is protected and generates additional 
returns. From the employees perspective a company is attractive if the working conditions are 
good, pay is acceptable and the workers’ voice is implemented in the companies’ strategy and 
policy. Only by getting responsible investors and powerful workforce, the companies are able to 
create value effectively and efficiently. 
Firms need capital and labour separately and together. The possibility of using a technology for 
production or offering services depends on both factors. Investments in new technologies or ser-
vices require capital and skilled employees. By increasing their productivity, the firms are able to 
compensate the additional costs for capital investments and skill formation (Crouch, Finegold & 
Sako 1999, p. 122). In other words, a skilled and committed workforce offers an incentive to 
invest in capital stock because it guarantees that the investments are used completely and trans-
forms high fixed costs into low unit costs. This allows the firms to increase their market share 
and returns (Abelshauser 1999, p. 231). From a German perspective, firms cannot compete glob-
ally through low prices. The institutional regime, with codetermination and strong unions, has 
forced the companies in the past to pursue a strategy with competing through quality (Thelen & 
Turner 1999, p. 204). But quality in production and services needs a skilled and motivated work-
force and which is guaranteed by a representation of labour (Sorge 1999, p. 25). Generating 
returns require investments in productivity growth and this depends both on capital investments 
and labour force. Therefore, it is hard to increase the productivity by neglecting the labour force. 
Without the use of new technologies by the workforce to create new value, investments in capital 
stock are fruitless. Capital and labour are interlocked. 
3.4.  Research Question 
Up to now, this paper has shown an overview regarding manifold effects of large companies on 
different spheres with highly relevant large corporations for regional economies. Although most 
companies try to concentrate their activities on operational business issues a certain responsi-
bility is linked to their general impact. Firms are not isolated entities, they interact with different 
stakeholders. The composition of institutional setting and stakeholders determines the corporate 
governance. Generally, economic geography research should deal with corporate governance con-
cepts more explicitly (Wójcik 2006, p. 640f.). 
The German model is especially characterized by an organised configuration between employers 
and their associations and the labour force and unions – summarized as a coordinated market 
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economy (Hall & Soskice 2001). One element in balancing the interests is labour representation in 
the supervisory boards of large stock companies. Despite this parity in the largest companies the 
recent debate has focused on the shareholder value model and therefore concentrated on the cap-
ital side and investors. For example Clark and Wójcik (2007, pp. 88ff.) have analysed the ownership 
concentration of German listed companies and find differences between the German states (Bun-
desländer). They thus conclude that there are regional trends towards weakening the coordinated 
market economy (Dixon 2010, p. 203). But, as already mentioned, many critics argue that a strong 
shareholder value orientation has some disadvantages, like short-term orientation, priority of 
management decision to push the share price, or instability of workers and growing wage ine-
quality (Aguilera & Jackson 2010, p. 486, Benton 2017, p. 662). The analysis here broadens the dis-
cussion with the typical investors’ view by including non-strictly economic indicators and con-
sidering the workers’ voice. As a matter of course, large amounts of capital should be gathered to 
make elementary investments to ensure competitiveness. But at same time it should be bore in 
mind, that the most important stock listed companies represent some millions of employees 
home and abroad and therefore have a crucial role in maintaining stability of the economies and 
societies. This fact should be more integrated in conceptions of corporate governance. 
The paper wants to fill two gaps. First, it wants to integrate the labour side in the corporate gov-
ernance discussion more intensely. Second, it refines the national varieties of capitalism 
approach regionally to identify differences in the representation of capital and labour. The fol-
lowing questions are central: Is it possible to identify locations that are highly interesting for 
investors and that guarantee a high level of labour representation as well – or is it vice versa? Or 
is there a mixture of investors’ favourites and workers’ voice? 
Looking from a higher socioeconomic point of view, it is important to know more about the loca-
tion of these companies, which are relevant in both spheres, because they are able to meet the 
requirements of investors and the labour force, which may run contrary. From a regional eco-
nomic perspective, these companies are highly relevant. If the companies, on the one hand, 
attract a high value at the stock market without a certain number of employees or without the 
ability to represent workers’ voice, regional income will be limited. For example, this is the case 
in pure holding companies, which are highly relevant for the stock market but less so for regional 
labour markets. The chance to generate further effects for the regional employment, for instance 
through suppliers and business partners, is low. If the companies, on the other hand, have a great 
effect on the regional labour markets but low attractiveness for investors, the situation is similar. 
The companies are unable to make investments to establish new technologies, products or ser-
vices. The opportunities to increase their productivity or grow substantially and sustainably are 
restricted and so are the prospects of having positive effects for the regional economies. 
4. Empirical Specification 
4.1.  Measuring the investors’ favourites 
A certain number of German large companies are family-owned; these include retailers but also 
automotive suppliers or mechanical engineering firms. Some companies are state-owned or part 
of foreign corporations but many of the largest are listed at the stock exchange too (Forbes 2016, 
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Die Welt 2016). The German stock market defines the prime standard and within the most impor-
tant in the indices DAX (Deutscher Aktienindex, 30 companies), MDAX (medium-sized caps, 50 com-
panies), SDAX (small caps, 50 companies) and the TecDAX (technology-orientend, 30 companies). 
The main requirements for listing the companies in these indices are free-float market capitali-
zation and stock market turnover in Germany (Deutsche Börse 2016b, p. 21). Founded on the assump-
tion that enough free-floating shares exist (at least 10%), an extensive stock market turnover sig-
nalizes high interest on the part of investors. The prime standard represents the most attractive 
German listed companies. This work does not try to elaborate a further quantification of inves-
tors’ favourites because stock listing is a key figure itself. For example, the market capitalization 
depends on share price, and the turnover rate is affected by monetary movements due to macroe-
conomic or fiscal developments on a global scale. It is hard to find a metric indicator that reflects 
a more long-term relevance of a share. Therefore this investigation uses the categorical differen-
tiation into DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX at the reporting date 2015 December 31 and takes the 
assumption that the interest of investors is guaranteed by listing in the prime standard. 
4.2.  Measuring the workers’ voice 
Representation of labour and codetermination as social phenomena are influenced by diverse 
institutional arrangements and human interactions. It is not possible to find a single indicator for 
representation. To reflect the workers’ voice, it is necessary to include different viewpoints and 
variables. From a methodological perspective, an index is suitable for including different varia-
bles. This allows a high complexity approach, and having an instrument which is manageably and 
therefore reduces complexity at the same time (Anand, Milne & Purda 2012, p. 76). By using an 
index the primary phenomenon is disassembled into portioned aspects. For these singled parts a 
concrete measureable indicator can be identified. Finally, all measured indicators are reassembled 
to reproduce the real main phenomenon. The resulting index value represents a complex social 
science phenomenon with only one measured value. By following this one number approach, it is 
possible to compare cases, like companies, directly or with other variables like indicators of com-
panies’ performance. 
The newly developed index of codetermination (Mitbestimmungsindex MB-ix) quantifies and 
measures the anchoring of codetermination in stock listed German companies (Scholz & Vitols 
2016). The MB-ix consists of six components, which include different aspects of representation of 
labour. The first component analyses the composition of the supervisory board by numbering and 
identifying the different mandates of the labour representatives. The second component focusses 
on the internal structure of the supervisory board by classifying the deputy chair, which is often 
filled by a labour representative. The third component reflects the existence and occupation of the 
board committees, which prepare decisions and meetings for the whole supervisory board. The 
fourth component integrates the level of internationalisation of employees and the existence of 
transnational labour representatives. The fifth component reflects the supervisory board influ-
ence, which is mainly determined by the legal form. Finally, the sixth component records the 
existence of a personnel director, who is independent from the Chief Executive Officer and Chief 
Financial Officer, to measure the relevance of the strategic personnel work in the investigated 
corporations. All six components form the MB-ix, in which components one to four, which repre-
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sent more direct aspects, have influences of 20 percent and components five and six of 10 per-
cent, as more indirect features. The MB-ix links the institutionally embedded instruments with 
the actors who define the instruments and implement practices. The MB-ix has a range between 
zero and 100. Zero reflects no representation of labour and 100 a completely fulfilled constella-
tion of labour representation regarding the mentioned components. 
4.3.  Data 
The database for this investigation consists of 160 stock listed companies in Germany, which are 
part of the stock market indices DAX, MDAX, SDAX and TecDAX as of 2015 December 31. The exact 
composition is defined and published by the German stock exchange (Deutsche Börse 2016a, pp. 
3ff.). Based on the stock listing, the MB-ix values were calculated for all of these companies. The 
configurations were extracted from the annual reports or requested from the companies directly 
in rare cases. In total 1,679 mandates in the supervisory boards were recorded and analysed. 
There are several reasons for selecting these companies. The main reason is the transparency of 
stock listed companies. Especially in Germany, there are many family-owned companies that are 
very restricted in publishing companies’ information. From an empirical perspective, stock listing 
helps to get necessary information. Furthermore, codetermination at company level is linked to 
the legal form of a stock company (Aktiengesellschaft AG). Other legal forms like the limited or 
limited partnership do not imply the integration of labour representatives into the control body 
of companies. Additionally, stock listed companies represent a certain number of employees that 
are central for this work. The 160 companies generate an employment of approx. 5.4 million in 
the corporations in total and from that 2.2 million in Germany.  Table 2 shows the differences of 
the size ratio depending on stock market index.  
Table 2: Numbers of companies and employees by stock market index 2015 
Stock market index Number of companies Number of employees Number of employees per company 
DAX 30 3,952,999 131,767 
MDAX 50 1,058,057 21,161 
SDAX 50 293,373 5,867 
TECDAX  30 103,046 3,435 
All 160 5,407,475 33,797 
Source: Own investigation and calculation. 
 
The German law defines concrete limits for labour representation. With more than 500 employees 
the companies have to have a one third labour representation in the supervisory board and with 
more than 2,000 employees a parity between representatives of capital and labour. As a first 
impression, the average numbers of employees per company indicates that in general most com-
panies should have codetermination in the supervisory board: section six will analyse it more 
explicitly. The following section five illustrates the spatial distribution of the stock listed compa-
nies previously. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Mapping the investors’ favourites 
By looking at the spatial distribution of the stock listed companies some remarkable characteris-
tics can be seen (see Table 3 and Figure 2).  
First of all, most of the companies are located in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse and 
Baden-Württemberg. At the same time there are no stock listed companies in the most Eastern 
and former GDR states, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Branden-
burg. The nearly total “lack of headquarters” in the Eastern states can be stressed. 
Table 3: Distribution of stock listed companies by state and cities, stock market index and location 
quotients 2015 
State (Bundesland) D 
A 
X 
M 
D 
A 
X 
S 
D 
A 
X 
T 
E 
C 
D 
A 
X 
Number 
of com-
panies 
Number 
of com-
panies 
(share in 
%) 
Location 
quotient* on 
basis of 
number of 
companies per 
km² (only 
Germany) 
Location 
quotient* on 
basis of num-
ber of com-
panies per 
inhabitant 
(only 
Germany) 
Location 
quotient* on 
basis of 
number of all 
companies 
(only 
Germany) 
Baden-Württemberg 3 6 5 4 18 11.25 1.20 0.91 0.88 
Bavaria 7 9 14 7 37 23.13 1.25 1.58 1.38 
Berlin 0 2 5 0 7 4.38 18.70 1.09 0.99 
Brandenburg 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 
Bremen 0 1 0 0 1 0.63 5.67 0.82 0.88 
Hamburg 1 5 4 4 14 8.75 44.16 4.29 3.20 
Hesse 7 6 5 4 22 13.75 2.48 1.95 1.87 
Lower Saxony 2 4 2 2 10 6.25 0.50 0.69 0.80 
Mecklenb.-W. Pomerania 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 
North Rhine-Westphalia 9 15 6 2 32 20.00 2.24 0.98 1.03 
Rhineland-Palatinate 1 0 2 2 5 3.13 0.60 0.68 0.71 
Saarland 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 
Saxony 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 
Saxony-Anhalt 0 0 0 0 0 - - - - 
Schleswig-Holstein 0 0 1 1 2 1.25 0.30 0.38 0.38 
Thuringia 0 0 0 2 2 1.25 0.29 0.50 0.55 
          
Germany 30 48 44 28 150 93.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Abroad 0 2 6 2 10 6.25 - - - 
All 30 50 50 30 160 100.00 - - - 
          
Most important cities by 
number of companies 
         
Munich (Bavaria) 5 3 5 5 18 11.25 - - - 
Hamburg 1 5 4 4 14 8.75 - - - 
Frankfurt a. M. (Hesse) 2 2 3 0 7 4.38 - - - 
Berlin 0 2 5 0 7 4.38 - - - 
Dusseldorf (North R.-W.) 1 5 0 0 6 3.75 - - - 
Essen (North R.-W.) 3 2 0 0 5 3.13 - - - 
Cologne (North R.-W.) 1 2 1 1 5 3.13 - - - 
*Location quotient = ((number of stock listed companies in state i)/(area or inhabitants or number of 
all companies in state i))/((150 stock listed companies in Germany)/(area or inhabitants or number of 
all companies in Germany)) (Data about area, inhabitants and number of all companies from Statis-
tisches Bundesamt 2016a and Statistisches Bundesamt 2016c). 
Source: Own investigation and calculation.  
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Figure 2: Spatial distribution of companies by stock exchange indices in Germany 2015 
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Source: Own illustration, based on Deutsche Börse 2016a. 
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Second, according to the four mentioned indices the DAX corporations are located primarily in 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria and Hesse, the medium sized MDAX corporations mainly in North 
Rhine-Westphalia and Bavaria, the small sized SDAX companies in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westpha-
lia and abroad and the majority of the technology oriented TECDAX firms in Bavaria.  
Third, the calculated location coefficients as relational measures state a further difference in dis-
tribution of companies. The coefficients measure whether the density of stock listed companies in 
the several states is higher (>1) or lower (<1) than the German average (=1) on the basis of area, 
inhabitants and all registered companies. A higher density in respect to all three coefficients can 
be found in Bavaria, Hamburg and Hesse. On the other end, Lower Saxony, Rhineland Palatinate, 
Schleswig Holstein and Thuringia have a much lower density of stock listed companies than the 
German average.  
Fourth, regarding the cities it can be seen that Munich and Hamburg are the most important cit-
ies, which together gain 20 percent of all 160 companies. Companies located in these both cities 
are the focal centres of the prime standard investors. 
Figure 2 additionally shows the spatial distribution of the 160 companies by the location of their 
headquarters. This map underlines the “empty East” on the one hand and the two main centres of 
Munich and Hamburg on the other hand. Apart from these extremes a certainly spread distribu-
tion of the other companies can be identified. 
5.2. Mapping the workers’ voice 
Having examined the spatial distribution of the stock listed companies in the previous section, 
this section goes further and analyses the distribution of workers’ voice (see Table 4 and Figure 3).  
First, corresponding with the missing companies the calculation of labour representation in the 
Eastern states failed.  
Second, Lower Saxony is overall the state with the highest labour force representation. The ratio 
of labour and capital representatives in the supervisory boards amounts to 46.9, whereas 50 
would be a parity situation between both sides. 9 of 10 companies have labour representatives in 
the supervisory boards and their average MB-ix counts 71.1 points. Schleswig-Holstein and Thu-
ringia also have high levels, but with much fewer companies. Furthermore the companies in 
North Rhine-Westphalia have a high level of labour representation too. 
Third, a remarkably low level of labour representation is identified for the German capital Berlin. 
Only one out of seven stock listed companies has labour representatives in the supervisory board 
and hence the average MB-ix=6.19 points is very low.  
Fourth, the situation in the states corresponds with the cities located within them. The companies 
in Dusseldorf, Essen and Cologne, all situated in North Rhine-Westphalia, have higher levels of 
labour representation than Munich, Frankfurt am Main and Hamburg or Berlin respectively. 
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Table 4: Distribution of stock listed companies by state and cities, number of labour and capital 
representatives and codetermination 2015 
State (Bundesland) Number of 
labour 
representa-
tives in 
supervisory 
boards 
Number of 
capital 
representa-
tives in 
supervisory 
boards 
Number of 
all members 
in super-
visory 
boards 
Labour 
representa-
tives in the 
supervisory 
boards 
(share in %) 
MB-ix 
average 
Number of com-
panies with 
labour represen-
tatives in super-
visory boards 
(share in %) 
Number of 
companies 
Baden-Württemberg 77 111 188 40.96 52.44 72.22 18 
Bavaria 160 232 392 40.82 49.31 67.57 37 
Berlin 3 39 42 7.14 6.19 14.29 7 
Brandenburg 0 0 0 - - - 0 
Bremen 0 3 3 0.00 0.00 0.00 1 
Hamburg 40 87 127 31.50 40.37 50.00 14 
Hesse 95 150 245 38.78 48.80 72.72 22 
Lower Saxony 61 69 130 46.92 71.10 90.00 10 
Mecklenb.-W. Pomerania 0 0 0 - - - 0 
North Rhine-Westphalia 173 237 410 42.20 62.99 75.00 32 
Rhineland-Palatinate 16 27 43 37.21 37.90 60.00 5 
Saarland 0 0 0 - - - 0 
Saxony 0 0 0 - - - 0 
Saxony-Anhalt 0 0 0 - - - 0 
Schleswig-Holstein 8 10 18 44.44 70.00 100.00 2 
Thuringia 8 10 18 44.44 61.43 100.00 2 
        
Germany 641 975 1616 39.67 50.83 68.00 150 
Abroad 0 63 63 0 0 0 10 
All 641 1038 1679 38.18 47.68 63.75 160 
        
Most important cities by 
number of companies 
       
Munich (Bavaria) 88 119 207 42.51 52.73 72.22 18 
Hamburg 40 87 127 31.50 40.37 50.00 14 
Frankfurt a. M. (Hesse) 36 56 92 39.13 49.01 42.86 7 
Berlin 3 39 42 7.14 6.19 14.29 7 
Dusseldorf (North R.-W.) 38 44 82 46.34 76.47 83.33 6 
Essen (North R.-W.) 44 44 88 50.00 93.89 100.00 5 
Cologne (North R.-W.) 24 32 56 42.86 64.72 80.00 5 
Source: Own investigation and calculation.  
 
Figure 3 shows the spatial distribution of the 160 companies according to their MB-ix in classes. 
Like the distribution of the companies themselves, the workers’ voice is spread as well, with the 
exception of Berlin. Remarkably there is no general distinction between urban and rural loca-
tions: instead, there is a mixture. Nevertheless, the following section combines the capital and 
labour view and discusses their interaction. 
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Figure 3: Spatial distribution of companies by Mitbestimmungsindex in Germany 2015 
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5.3. Spatial configuration of capital and labour 
After analysing the both spheres separately, this section combines both factors on an aggregated 
state level. Figure 4 shows the interplay and identifies a tendency towards distinction. There are 
four fields with low or high levels of investors’ interests and workers’ voice in comparison to the 
national level. The first group of states, Berlin, Bremen and Rhineland-Palatinate, have a lower 
density of companies than the national average as well as a below-average level regarding labour 
representation. The second group are states with companies that are highly relevant for the stock 
market but with labour representation below the national average, namely Hamburg, Hesse and 
Bavaria. The third group of states is characterized by an underperforming number of companies 
but an above-average level of labour representation, namely Schleswig-Holstein, Thuringia, Lower 
Saxony and Baden-Württemberg. Fourth and finally North Rhine-Westphalia is the only state with 
an above-average number of companies and level of labour representation as well. Apart from 
North Rhine-Westphalia the most states attract either capital or labour. 
Figure 4: Location coefficients in German states based on Mitbestimmungsindex and the number of 
companies 
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Source: Own calculation and illustration based on Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
Certainly, this constellation has its origin in historical pathways influenced by long-term sectoral 
developments, technological inventions, political majorities and more. The reasons for this spatial 
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distribution can be mainly derived from these facts. For example in North Rhine-Westphalia there 
are large companies of the “old economy”, i.e. energy, chemistry and metal, or in Lower Saxony, 
there is the automotive sector; with a traditionally high relevance of codetermination and social 
partnership in these sectors. On the other hand, companies of the “new economy”, i.e. technology 
oriented firms, are situated primarily in urban centres like Munich and Hamburg and they are 
much younger. Additionally, the political sphere is relevant too. In the southern states Bavaria and 
Baden-Württemberg traditionally the conservatives are having higher impact whereas the social 
democrats are stronger in North Rhine-Westphalia and Lower Saxony. In general it should be 
stressed that the configuration and rise of corporations as well as the system of codetermination 
depend on many influences which cannot be modelled or quantified easily. General causalities are 
hard to find and the developments are path dependent and historically contextualised. 
However, the distinction between capital and labour is remarkable. The actors’ interests, illus-
trated in Figure 1, can be hardly combined, which is an important result with regard to corporate 
governance. The possibilities to reconcile the interests of capital and labour simultaneously are 
limited. The findings conclude a distinction from a regional perspective: either many companies 
with low level of labour representation or fewer companies with high level of labour represen-
tation. But, further research should include a dynamic perspective. Because the investors’ care 
reflects the stock market composition: corporations with weak growth should be switched by 
strong growing ones. The moderately growing ones are mostly old and large companies with a 
correspondingly high level of labour representation. The latter ones are mainly young and grow-
ing companies with a lower level of labour representation or none at all. Once again, the analysis 
shows the distinction between capital and labour. Otherwise more regions would combine high 
importance for investors and labour representatives as well. 
6. Conclusion 
How are stock exchange listing and codetermination spatially intertwined in Germany? While the 
most studies dealing with corporate governance argue from an investors’ perspective and analyse 
the concentration of ownership, little empirical work has been done from a labour point of view. 
This paper adds the latter perspective to the present discussion. Whereas many studies focus on 
shareholder value, this paper suggests conceptually a shifting focus from shareholder value to 
stakeholder value. One most important stakeholder is the labour force, which this paper inte-
grates into the scientific discussion. By operationalising workers’ voice through a newly devel-
oped index, the work presents an effective instrument. A hand-collected special database recorded 
1,679 mandates of all supervisory boards in 160 prime standard listed companies and combines 
different components into only one measured value (Mitbestimmungsindex). This one number 
approach is linked to the corporations’ spatial distribution. Therefore the article analyses the 
investors’ interests and the workers’ voice of in Germany listed companies from a spatial point of 
view. 
In absolute terms, most of stock listed companies are situated in Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Hesse, and Baden-Württemberg absolutely and in relation to area, inhabitants and all companies 
in Bavaria, Hamburg and Hesse. The main cities of headquarters are Munich and Hamburg. The 
highest level of labour representation can be found in the companies situated in Lower Saxony, 
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followed by Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia which have a small number of companies and 
North Rhine-Westphalia again. The companies in Dusseldorf, Essen and Cologne, all situated in 
North Rhine-Westphalia, have an extraordinary level of labour representation compared with 
other cities where a certain number of companies are headquartered. Finally, the paper identifies 
different possibilities between the capital side and representation of labour and concludes a diffi-
cult reconciliation of both at state level. Only one German state, namely North Rhine-Westphalia, 
is characterized by more prime standard listed companies and a higher level of labour represen-
tation than the German average simultaneously. From a corporate governance perspective this 
reflects the distinction between capital and labour and the difficulties in satisfying both spheres. 
From a regional perspective the paper concludes states with either many companies to the 
expense of labour representation or fewer companies for the benefit of labour representation.  
Based on these findings it is somewhat difficult to claim that there is one German model, as the 
varieties of capitalism model does. This analysis has shown a spatial and qualitative difference of 
investors’ interests and representation of labour. At the same time the study concluded that it is 
difficult to combine interests of both spheres. Therefore it can be shown a deviation from the 
overall German situation, with regions where many companies with low or missing codetermi-
nation and regions with a fewer number of companies but higher levels of codetermination. More 
modes of governance exist or in the varieties of capitalism approach a certain number of German 
models. 
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